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DAMfailed to replace a damaged traffic signal. A motorist entered the intersection against the inoperative light and injured a driver who
had entered the intersection relying on a functioning green signal. Held, the
city was negligent in the exercise of a corporate duty, as distinguished from a
governmental function, and, as the negligence was the proximate cause of the
injury, was liable. Johnston v. City of East Moline, 405 Ill. 460, 91 N.E. (2d)
401 (1950).
In determining the tort liability of a municipal corporation the courts invariably distinguish between the city's governmental and corporate functions. 1 If it
is determined that negligence arose in the performance of a governmental function, immunity is granted the municipality; if it arose in the performance of a
corporate or proprietary function, liability is fixed. 2 It has been suggested that
if the function is judicial or political rather than merely ministerial, then no liaMUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORT Ll'.ABILITY-FAILURE TO REPLACE

AGED TRAFFIC SIGNAL-A city

1 For historical development of the distinction see Barnett, "The Foundations of a
Distinction between Public and Private Functions," 16 ORE. L. REv. 250 (1937). For a
concise statement of the law on the subject see PnossER, Ton'I's 1066-75 (1941).
2 CooLEY, MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS 357 (1914). Apparently, Irvine v. Greenwood,
89 S.C. 511, 72 S.E. 228 (1911), discards the test.
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bility for negligence will attach.3 Thus, when a municipal corporation fails completely to light a public bridge, no liability is found; though if the city undertakes
the task, but does so negligently, it is held responsible.4 Other cases have held
that if the function is proprietary in nature, as distinguished from governmental,
liability may be incurred.5 Faithful application of this doctrine led one court to
the paradox that a plaintiff injured by negligence relating to current supplied
by the city for street lamps could not recover, while a plaintiff injured by negligence relating to current supplied by the city to its residents could.6 As a result
of the hardship imposed by such an arbitrary standard, the reports contain many
concurring and dissenting voices.7 Legal writers have urged vast expansion of
municipal corporation tort liability. Some argue that it should be almost as
sweeping as that of private corporations.8 The Illinois court does not quarrel with
the majority of jurisdictions which have found the municipality liable for negligent failure to repair streets and sidewalks,9 nor which, on the other hand, have
granted immunity for negligent acts of its policemen engaged in regulatory acts,10
but in deciding that negligent failure to repair traffic signals is similar to failure
to repair a damaged street and thus is a breach of a corporate duty, this court
is sharply departing from the unanimous decisions of other courts which hold
that the signal in function is akin to the policeman who regulates traffic, and
which,. consequently, impose no liability.11 It is submitted that if the premise
is accepted, the deduction of the majority is the more sound. The Illinois court,
s WmTB, NEGLIGENCE oF MUNICIPAL CoRPoRATIONS 47 (1920).
4 Chicago v. Powers, 42 ill. 169, 89 Am. Dec. 412 (1866); Freeport v. Isbell, 83 ill.
440, 25 Am. Rep. 407 (1876). The net result is that the plaintiff who could see nothing is
shunned by the court, but the person who could see somewhat is favored. While it is a
proposition in the law of torts generally that a duty to act will not be imposed, though action
voluntarily undertaken requires care [PROSSER, ToRTS 191 (1941)], the distinctions in this
area are treated in terms of judicial or ministerial functions.
5 WmTB, NEGLIGENCE OF MUNICIPAL CoRPORATIONS 29 (1920).
6 Hodgins v. Bay City, 156 Mich. 687, 121 N.W. 274 (1909).
7 See the excellent dissenting opinion of Clarkson, J., in Hodges v. City of Charlotte,
214 N.C. 737, 200 S.E. 889 (1939).
s Borchard, in "Government Liability in Tort," 34 YALE L.J. 129 (1926), says, "In
few, if any, branches of the law have the courts labored more abjectly under the supposed
inexorable domination of formulas, phrases and terminology, with the result that facts have
often been tortured into the framework of a formula, lacking in many cases any sound basis
of reason or policy." Smith, "Municipal Tort Liability," 48 Mi:cH. L. REv. 41 (1949);
Harno, ''Tort Immunity of Municipal Corporations,'' 4 ILL. L.Q. 28 (1921); Lloyd, "Municipal Tort Liability in New York-a Legislative Challenge," 23 N.Y. Umv. L.Q. REv.
278 (1948); Tooke, ''The Extension of Municipal Liability in Tort," 19 VA. L. REv. 97
(1932); Seasongood, ''Municipal Corporations: Objections to the Governmental or Proprietary Test," 22 VA. L. REv. 910 (1936).
9 43 C.J. 998 (1927).
10 43 C.J. 964 (1927).
llAvey v. West Palm Beach, 152 Fla. 717, 12 S. (2d) 881 (1943); Auslander v. St.
Louis, 332 Mo. 145, 56 S.W. (2d) 778 (1933); Vickers v. Camden, 122 N.J.L. 14, 3 A.
(2d) 613 (1939); Parsons v. New York City, 273 N.Y. 547, 7 N.E. (2d) 685 (1937);
Hodges v. Charlotte, supra note 7; Tolliver v. Newark, 145 Ohio St. 517, 62 N.E. (2d)
357 (1945). See also Martin v. Winchester, 278 Ky. 200, 128 S.W. (2d) 543 (1939);
and Baker v. Waco, (Tex. Civ. App. 1939) 129 S.W. (2d) 499. See cases collected in 161
A.L.R. 1404 (1946).
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while accepting the test of the majority, has strained the fact situation to £t a
category which gives the desired result.12 While the end obtained is desirable,
nothing but confusion is added to an already clouded picture, for it is impossible
to predict when the court will again depart from the recognized principles by
means of circuitous reasoning. The case suggests again the necessity for a reexamination of the traditional basis of municipal corporation tort liability.

Wendell B. Will

12 Green, in "Freedom of Litigation: III," 38 Iu.. L. REv. 355 at 363 (1944), points
out that the Illinois court has consistently extended municipal tort liability whenever the
injury resulted from negligence having to do with "streets."

